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Driving Priorities in Risk-based Regulation:
What's the Problem?
Robert Baldwin* and Julia Black*
Both risk-based and problem-centred regulatory techniques emphasize
giving priority to matters that are serious and important. In the case of
both risks and problems, however, issues of identification, selection,
and prioritization involve inescapably normative and political choices.
It is important, therefore, to understand why regulators target the risks
and problems that they do; which factors drive such choices; and how
regulation is affected when these factors pull in similar or opposite
directions. Such an understanding provides a fresh framework for
thinking about the challenges of both risk-based and problem-centred
regulation. The analysis presented here does not oppose either risk-
based or problem-centred regulation, but it illustrates why neither is as
straightforward as simple calls for `better regulation' may suggest, and
it proposes ways in which key aspects of those challenges may be
addressed.
Risk-based regulation has been a central tenet of the United Kingdom
government's `better regulation' agenda since the Hampton review in 2005,
and it is a key element of the better regulation agenda of the OECD and
many of its member states.1 The core proposal of risk-based regulation is
that regulators, in principle, should focus their efforts on the most serious
risks that they face in achieving their objectives. This risk-based approach to
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regulation runs parallel to Malcolm Sparrow's exhortation that regulators
should `pick important problems and fix them'.2
The key proposition in both risk-based and problem-centred regulatory
techniques is thus simple enough: prioritize the matters that are serious and
important. Many regulators, however, have implemented risk-based regula-
tion in the last ten to fifteen years and their experiences have highlighted
some significant challenges, not least concerning the selection and
prioritization of risks. What constitutes a risk or a problem can be contested,
and perceptions and evaluations can vary considerably.
Identifying the `important' risks and problems is not as straightforward as
it sounds. Risks and problems are also quite distinct. Risks are adverse events
that may occur in the future. Problems are things that have happened or are
happening or may happen and which require attention. In the case of both
risks and problems, however, issues of identification, selection, and
prioritization involve inescapably normative and political choices. It is
important, therefore, to understand why regulators target the risks and
problems that they do; which factors influence such choices; and how
regulation is affected when these factors pull in similar or opposite directions.
This article explores the factors that drive the identification and
prioritization of risks and problems, how those factors can interact, and
the effects of such interactions. A `driver' of risk or problem identification is
thus seen here as a factor that shapes the construction of a risk or problem
and/or which impacts on the prioritization of that risk or problem. In
examining such drivers, the discussion below draws on existing primary and
secondary literature on risk-based regulation (and risk identification more
generally) and on interviews with regulators.3 It commences by setting the
elements of risk-based regulation alongside those of Sparrow's `problem-
centred' approach, then turns to examine the factors that drive the
identification of risks and problems. We argue that when regulators attempt
to identify and prioritize issues for attention, they are influenced by three
main sets of factors, which can mutually reinforce or operate in tension: the
way they tend to think about risks or problems (their theoretical or
ideological perspectives); operational constraints (especially the resources
they have available); and political, communicative or reputational factors,
stemming from their need to maintain their reputation and legitimacy in the
eyes of their political overseers and the public at large.
We contend that an exploration of the interplay between these drivers of
risk/problem identification provides a fresh framework for thinking about the
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2 M. Sparrow, The Regulatory Craft (2000); M. Sparrow, The Character of Harms
(2008) 5.
3 Conducted primarily in the United Kingdom over the last decade with a focus on the
development and implementation of regulators' risk-based frameworks, including
semi-structured interviews with officials at the Scottish Environmental Protection
Agency in 2013.
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challenges of both risk-based and problem-centred regulation. It shows how
risk-based regulation builds on complex and competing approaches to the
construction of risks and it demonstrates that problem-centred regulation
gives rise to a specific but identifiable set of difficulties. Our analysis does
not oppose either risk-based or problem-centred regulation, but it illustrates
why neither is as straightforward as simple calls for `better regulation' may
suggest, and it proposes ways in which key aspects of those challenges may
be addressed.
RISK-BASED AND PROBLEM-CENTERED REGULATION
Risks and problems, as noted, have different dimensions in time. A `risk'
involves a prospective element but a `problem' can be seen as broader in
conception and as covering undesired harms of past or current occurrence as
well as risks of future harms.4 The challenges of identifying `key risks' and
`important problems' are, however, similar, though not identical.5 For the
most part this discussion will refer to both risks and problems collectively
(referring to `risks') but will differentiate where this matters to the issues of
identification, selection, and prioritization.
Risk-based regulation is commonly taken to mean that regulators operate
decision-making frameworks and procedures to prioritize regulatory
activities and the deployment of resources according to an assessment of
the risks that regulated firms pose to the regulator's objectives.6 Initially, risk-
based regulation was introduced to provide a way of prioritizing inspections
but it has become, for some regulators, a more holistic concept, encompassing
wider strategic policy decisions. The challenges regulators face in identifying
risks are increasingly well-documented, and often include: selecting the
appropriate indicators, gathering sufficient information with respect to those
indicators, assessing probabilities (particularly for low-probability, high-
impact events), assessing the ability of management systems and processes to
mitigate risk, and dealing with uncertainties rather than risks that can be
567
4 See A. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (1990); J. Black, `The Role of Risk
in Regulatory Processes' in The Oxford Handbook of Regulation, eds. R. Baldwin,
M. Cave, and M. Lodge (2010). In a risk-based regime, key risks are routinely
identified by cascading from statutory mandates to key risks to key sub-risks in a
rationalistic calculus involving references to risk-scoring mechanisms. In a problem-
based regime, important problems are identified and selected for attention on more
general policy or political grounds: Sparrow, op. cit. (2008), n. 2, pp. 11, 154.
5 The prospectivity of risks, for example, involves evidential challenges of a kind
absent with harms that have occurred.
6 See J. Black, `Risk-Based Regulation: Choices, Practices and Lessons Learnt' in
Risk and Regulatory Policy: Improving the Governance of Risk, ed. OECD (2010);
H. Rothstein, M. Gruber, and G. Gaskell, `A Theory of Risk Colonization' (2006) 35
Economy and Society 91.
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easily calculated. These challenges are additional to those relating to deter-
minations on prioritization, decisions on whether to err on the side of
precaution or permission, or judgements on what, if any, level of failure is
politically tolerable.7
Malcolm Sparrow's concept of `problem-centred' regulation is wider in
scope and involves regulators moving away from a focus on process-based
interventions towards an emphasis on dealing with key problems. Thus,
instead of seeking routinely to apply the enforcement powers and processes
that regulators possess, Sparrow argues that they should: `Pick the important
problems and examine each of them in their own right, and without regard
for any tool-based traditions or preferences.'8 Organizational embedding of
the problem-centred approach would come when a regulator had constructed
and maintained:
. . . a portfolio of harm-mitigation projects, each one aimed at a carefully
identified and delineated concentration. There would no longer be any
ambiguity about which problems had been selected, and which ones not, nor
who was responsible for designing relevant interventions.9
Malcolm Sparrow, of course, is aware that moving away from process-
driven work10 is challenging. In The Character of Harms11 he argues that
driving forward his approach demands that organizations take three main
steps. They should, in the first instance, establish a protocol for problem
solving, comprising: `a sequence of distinct stages through which any one
harm-reduction project might proceed.' They should, second, create a
managerial infrastructure, by virtue of which an institution can `construct,
direct, support and monitor its overall portfolio of harm-reduction projects'
and, third, they should establish `an organizational interface' between this
type of work and others: `so that all the proper interactions between them can
be understood and facilitated.'
Sparrow concedes that the challenge of identifying key problems is
considerable and he states that selecting the dimensions in which to describe
a problem: `is an inherently messy business, involving artful choice and
instinct as much as analysis and science.'12 This article seeks to address the
complexity of that identification, selection, and prioritization process. It is
designed to add to Sparrow's analysis by throwing further light on the ways
in which different approaches to risk and problem identification come
together and impact on both risk-based and problem-centred regulation. The
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7 See Black, id.
8 Sparrow, op. cit. (2008), n. 2, p. 153.
9 id., p. 154.
10 Process-driven work focuses attention on applying established procedures (for
example, enforcing statutory rules) whereas problem-driven regulation emphasizes
the prevention of key harms (id., pp. 49±66).
11 id., p. 157.
12 id., p. 97. See, also, H. Goldstein, Problem-Oriented Policing (1990).
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next two sections of this article, accordingly, explore the different drivers of
risk/problem identification and consider how regulators can deal with the
operational difficulties that interactions between these can give rise to.
CONSTRUCTING RISKS AND PROBLEMS:
THREE SETS OF DRIVERS
It has long been recognized that the ways in which risks or problems are
constructed and selected for attention is fundamental to their regulation ± if
the risk or problem is not recognized, it will not even move on to the agenda.
If it is recognized, then the way it is constructed will shape the manner in
which it is then assessed and managed.13 What really underpins risk-based
regulation, therefore, is not just how risks are scored and quantified, though
that is important, but the prior issue of how they are constructed, packaged,
and identified ± those formulations are at once the drivers and the building
blocks of risk-based regulation. These modes of construction, and their
impacts on regulatory implementation are, however, less explored than many
other aspects of risk governance. The same is true of a `problem-centred'
approach. As with risks, the `problem with problems' is that there are often a
number of ways they can be constructed, and, indeed, a number of solutions
which are deemed appropriate to fit the problem, as long as it is constructed
in a certain way.14 It is worth restating that problems are distinct from risks
in some key ways but there are areas of commonality so, for the sake of
brevity, points made about `risks' in the discussion below will be taken to
apply also to `problems' unless otherwise stated.15
A `risk' is far from an atomistic, unitary entity with an objective exist-
ence: instead it can more usefully be seen as a cluster of different causes and
effects that is assembled for a given purpose according to a principle of
framing or selection. Regulators have to decide how, in effect, to construct
the risk.16 The discussion below draws on the broad literature on risk
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13 See D. Rochefort and R. Cobb (eds.), The Politics of Problem Definition (1994),
especially ch. 1; D. Dery, Problem Definition in Policy Analysis (1984); A. Tversky
and D. Kahneman, `The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice' (1981)
211 Science 453; M. Douglas and A. Wildavsky, Risk and Culture (1983); S. Krimsky
and D. Golding, Social Theories of Risk (1992); B. Hutter and M. Power, Organiza-
tional Encounters with Risk (2005); M. Power, Organized Uncertainty (2007); S.
Hilgartner, `The Social Construction of Risk Objects' in Organizations, Uncertainties,
and Risk, eds. J. Short and L. Clark (1992); C. Hood, The Art of the State (1998).
14 As March and Olsen observed some decades ago, in a `garbage can' model of
decision making, solutions and problems can come together for quite incidental
reasons: see M.D. Cohen, J.G. March, and J.P. Olsen, `A Garbage Can Model of
Organizational Choice' (1972) 17 Administrative Sci. Q. 1.
15 On overlaps between the terms `risks', problems', `harms', and so on, see Sparrow,
op. cit. (2008), n. 2, pp. 10±11.
16 See E. Seidman and J. Rappaport, Redefining Social Problems (1986).
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identification to highlight a number of drivers of risk identification and
prioritization before the implications of contests between such drivers are
further explored. We argue that the factors that drive risk identification,
selection, and prioritization can be conceived as falling into three main
categories ± theoretical or ideological perspectives; operational and
resourcing factors; and political communicative and reputational pres-
sures.17 It is important to stress that the different drivers of risk
identification, selection and prioritization that fall into these three categories
will often compete with each other both within and across categories.18
Sometimes, as noted, different drivers will, instead, reinforce each other.
1. Theoretical perspectives
The risk literature stresses that theoretical, ideological, and cognitive frame-
works loom large in the construction of risks and that there is nothing as
straightforward as a `technical' assessment of risk. Renn, for instance, has
distinguished between seven different ideological perspectives on the
conception and assessment of risks. These frameworks of ideas range from
the actuarial, toxicological, and engineering to the economic, psychological,
social, and cultural.19 The array of such frameworks is discussed in an
extensive body of publications, most notably in the fields of cognitive and
social psychology as well as behavioural economics.20 For current purposes,
it suffices to note the degree to which such frameworks imply different risk
agendas. Actuarial, toxicological, and engineering approaches, for instance,
are concerned with measuring and managing risks; economic perspectives
focus on taking the products of any one or more of these three approaches
and putting them into monetary terms in order to determine risk-benefit
trade-offs. Psychological perspectives examine perceptions of risks, and
social and cultural perspectives ask: why is something considered a risk in
the first place and by whom?
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17 This argument builds on a review of risk-based systems in a number of regulators
around the world and semi-structured interviews with regulators responsible for
developing and implementing risk-based approaches in a number of United
Kingdom regulatory agencies. See, also, Rochefort and Cobb, op. cit., n. 13.
18 The Irish Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)'s categorization of septic tank
risks was initially based on operational factors but this approach was trumped by
considerations of political accountability in 2012±13: see R. Baldwin, J. Black, and
G. O'Leary, `Risk Regulation and Transnationality: Institutional Accountability as a
Driver of Innovation' (2014) 3 Transnational Environmental Law 373.
19 See O. Renn, `Concepts of Risk: A Classification' in Krimsky and Golding, op. cit.
n. 13.
20 See, for example, Krimsky and Golding, id.; N. Pidgeon et al., `Risk Perception' in
Risk: Analysis, Perception, Management, ed. Royal Society (1992); P. Slovic, The
Perception of Risk (2000); O. Renn et al., `The Social Amplification of Risk' (1988)
8 Risk Analysis 177; D. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011).
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Such theoretical or ideological frameworks are encountered in myriad
versions and all of these can impact on the ways in which regulators
construct, identify, and evaluate risks and the ways that they manage and
communicate about them.21 In the financial world, for instance, the mathe-
matical modelling systems that are used to measure risks tend to both
incorporate and drive understandings about the risks that are of concern to
regulators and managers.22 What can be constructed to allow measurement,
moreover, is what gets managed. Thus, Power has argued that the emergence
of the idea of `operational risk' in the financial sector in the 1990s provided
both a new object of managerial attention and a new means of constructing
risks.23 The identification of particular `risk objects' in such situations
becomes a product of the prevailing control or managerial theory.
Two particular messages can be taken from the literature on cognition.
First, divergent views on risks will be taken in so far as parties are affected
differently by the various biases and deficiencies that afflict thinking on
risk.24 Secondly, different risk priorities will be established where different
stances are taken on the levels of subjectivity inherent in risk assessments,
and the potential of experts or procedures such as cost-benefit analysis in the
evaluation of risks. Thus, Kahneman has contrasted Slovic's emphasis on the
subjectivity of risk evaluations with Sunstein's `faith in the objectivity that
may be achieved by science, expertise, and careful deliberation.'25 These
respective positions can be expected to identify risks in dissimilar ways.
Disciplinary perspectives can shape risk constructions as much as par-
ticular ideas. Thus, in her study of risk control in the United States Space
Shuttle Program by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), Dianne Vaughan recounts how risks were filtered and selected for
attention (and `deviance normalised') by application of `the methods of
scientific positivism . . . learned in engineering school'.26 These methods
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21 D. Vaughan, `Organizational Rituals of Risk and Error' in Hutter and Power, op.
cit., n. 13; Hood, op. cit., n. 13.
22 These were were shown in the crisis to be prey to the same cognitive biases that
beset any exercise in risk identification and evaluation: see, for example, D.
Mackenzie, `Mathematizing Risk: Models, Arbitrage and Crises' in Hutter and
Power, id.
23 `Risk objects' were `re-constructed within the fresh discourse of operational risk' so
as to have a new `conceptual location and status for managerial and regulatory
purposes': Power, op. cit., n. 13, p. 125. On the post-financial crisis rise of new
`macro-prudential' management tools, see A. Baker, `The gradual transformation?'
(2013) 7 Regulation and Governance 417; J. Black, `Restructuring Global and EU
Financial Regulation' in Financial Regulation and Supervision: A Post Crisis
Analysis, eds. E. Wymeersch, K. Hopt, and G. Ferrarini (2012).
24 On which see, for example, A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, `Judgement Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases' (1974) 185 Science 1124.
25 See Kahneman, op. cit., n. 20, pp. 141±2; Slovic, op. cit., n. 20; C. Sunstein, Risk
and Reason (2002) and The Cost-Benefit State (2002).
26 Vaughan, op. cit., n. 21.
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structured not only the selection of certain risks for attention but also cultural
understandings of risk and modes of conveying risk information throughout
NASA.27 In the context of pre-crisis financial regulation, it was the wide-
spread orthodoxy of financial economics that it was sufficient for prudential
regulators to focus on the financial stability of individual banks. The
systemic risk posed by their interconnections in the financial system was
simply not recognized ± again there was a system blindness, this time
induced by cognitive understandings of the nature of financial systems, and
thus the risks being created.28
How parties understand the role and nature of good regulatory admini-
stration can itself shape risk constructions. Thus, Elizabeth Fisher draws a
contrast between deliberative-constitutive and rational-instrumental con-
ceptions of administrative constitutionalism. In the former, the role of public
administration is characterized in flexible, discretionary terms, and, in the
latter, it is understood more mechanically as a `transmission-belt',
`Weberian-type agent of the legislature'.29 These respective paradigms will
correspond to quite different perspectives on the identification and control of
risks, with the former emphasizing risk identifications through flexible,
deliberative procedures (with no separation of scientific and political
processes)) and the latter relying much more heavily on technical/analytical
evaluations of assigned tasks that are set out in legal mandates.30
Cultural theory, in turn, suggests that different attitudes or worldviews
will lead to different approaches to risk construction. Thus, as deployed by
Mary Douglas and others, cultural theory places emphasis on two main
forces that impact on attitudes to problems and solutions: those flowing from
`grid' and `group'± where `grid' denotes the degree to which lives are
circumscribed by conventions, norms or rules, and `group' refers to the
constraints on individual choices that stem from collective social forces and
processes.31 This form of analysis suggests that four broadly different types
572
27 id., pp. 43±4. Also C. Elder and R. Cobb, The Political Uses of Symbols (1983). On
`emplacing risk objects in the conceptual frameworks inhabited by actors' see
Hilgartner, op. cit., n. 13.
28 Financial Services Authority (FSA), The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to
the Global Banking Crisis (2009).
29 See E. Fisher, Risk Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism (2007) 28±40;
A. Deville and R. Harding, Applying the Precautionary Principle (1997).
30 Fisher, id., pp. 32±5.
31 See M. Douglas, In the Active Voice (1982) 183±254; M. Thompson et al., Cultural
Theory (1990); Hood, op. cit., n. 13, ch. 1. The `grid/group' breakdown purports to
`capture much' without being exhaustive (Hood, p. 6) and is arguably narrower than
the `theoretical, operational, political' breakdown employed here ± though the
boundaries of grid and group are subject to debate: see V. Mamadouh, `Grid-group
cultural theory: an introduction' (1999) 47 GeoJournal 395. For critiques of `grid/
group' and its limitations in explaining attitudes to risk, see A. Boholm, `The
Cultural Theory of Risk: An Anthropological Critique' (1996) 61 Ethnos 64; S.
Oltedal et al., Explaining Risk Perception: An Evaluation of Cultural Theory (2004).
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of attitude, or worldviews, will produce different approaches to risk
perceptions and identifications.32 Fatalists (actors subject to high-grid and
low-group forces) will tend to structure risk identifications with reference to
the stipulations of rules and norms, but will lack cohesion in interpreting and
applying those rules. Hierarchists (high grid, high group) will also structure
risk identifications with pronounced reference to rule structures but will
approach those rules in a socially more coherent and coordinated fashion.
Individualists (low grid, low group), in contrast, will prioritize risks with
reference to impacts on themselves and will favour controls based on
markets and the pursuit of individual interests rather than rules and social
forces. Egalitarians (low grid, high group) will identify risks and priorities
with reference not to rules but to the group ethos and to collective
deliberations, interests, and approaches.
2. Operational drivers
A second set of drivers of risk identification derives from the constraints on
regulatory operations that stem from regulators' legal, organizational,
resourcing, and informational frameworks and positions.33 For most
regulators, the starting point for their operations is their legal mandate. The
United Kingdom's then Financial Services Authority (FSA), for example,
framed the groups of risks on which it focused as `risks to objectives'.34 The
FSA was, indeed, one of the first United Kingdom regulators explicitly to
prioritize the issue of risk identification and selection. In its early days it
constructed a `risk map' and balanced its attention to firm-based, consumer
and industry-wide, external environment and thematically-defined risks. This
was seen by that agency to be at least as important as how it went about
quantifying any given risk.35
Whether a phenomenon or activity is identified as a risk will depend on a
regulatory body's interpretation of its mandate, as will its making trade-offs
between the often conflicting outcomes that the mandate expects it to
achieve.36 In the case of the FSA, for example, the Authority was required
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32 See Hood, id., p. 9.
33 C. Hood, H. Rothstein, and R. Baldwin, The Government of Risk (2001) 63.
34 See J. Black, `The emergence of risk-based regulation and the new public risk
management in the United Kingdom' [2005] Public Law 512.
35 See FSA, Building the New Regulator: Progress Report 2 (2002) 5±6.
36 The failure of the mandate to cover a matter is likely to mean that the risk is not seen
or addressed. The Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board, in its report, The
Buncefield Incident 11 December 2005: The Final Report (2008) found that no one
involved in the planning or regulatory regime with respect to the petrochemical
storage site had considered the risks to the surrounding inhabitants from an
explosion on the site as it was not in their mandates to do so. The Royal Commission
Report on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy (2012) found that the licensing
authority did not have a mandate to consider health and safety in issuing licences.
Prior to the financial crisis, the FSA was not required specifically to maintain
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both to consider the competitiveness of the United Kingdom's financial
system and to ensure appropriate consumer protection. It sought to deal with
that tension in accordance with its interpretation of its mandate, and it is
worth noting that its risk-based framework went through several iterations
during the FSA's lifespan.
In some regulatory systems, certain risks are selected not so much with
reference to mandated objectives as to the categories of sites, activities or
regulated firms that the legal regime establishes. In environmental
regulation, for example, it is common for statutes, first, to create vertical
`silos' of risks, and then, within each silo, to establish tiers of registration or
licensing arrangements. These legally-structured arrangements, in turn,
influence the way in which risks are `sliced and diced' for operational
purposes. In the environmental sector in England and Wales there are four
main statutory regimes: for pollution prevention and control; waste
management; water quality; and radioactive substances. Within each regime,
there are statutory `tiers': for some activities and/or sites specialist licences
are required, for others a standard licence, for others notification, and so
forth. Risk categorizations in such regimes can thus relate to legal frames
rather than the levels of risk that scientific assessments might produce. Thus,
when the Environment Agency (EA) first introduced a risk-based regime, it
confined it to those activities requiring an integrated pollution permit control
(IPPC) licence and only after a few years did the EA extend risk-based
regulation to other parts of its remit.37 In the United States medical field it
has similarly been argued that risk categorizations have been strongly
structured by the laws and rules that govern clinical practice.38
Configurations of enforcement powers may also shape risk constructions
and prioritizations: as Wildavsky has pointed out, a public official will tend
not to take a problem seriously unless something can be done about it.39
Thus, the Commission investigating the United States Deepwater Horizon
disaster found that Minerals Management Service officials were aware of the
significant environmental risks posed by new off-shore drilling technologies,
but there were no rules in place to regulate them. As a result, the risks were
simply not recognized, in operational terms, by the agency, because it had no
power to act.40
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financial stability, although it was responsible for the prudential regulation of banks
and insurance companies.
37 See, similarly, Environment Agency, Guidance on Low Risk Waste Activities
(2010).
38 C. Heimer et al., `Risks and Rules: the `` Legalization'' of Medicine' in Hutter and
Power, op. cit., n. 13.
39 A. Wildavsky, Speaking Truth to Power (1979) 42, quoted in Rochefort and Cobb,
op. cit., n. 13, p. 25.
40 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling,
Deepwater ± the Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, Report to the
President (2011).
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The legal powers of regulators may, moreover, vary across the different
tasks of regulation. Risks will, therefore, tend to be constructed in the light of
the particular powers that the regulator has to deploy in order to discharge
different tasks ± be that carrying out investigations, defining compliance or
prosecuting. Where units within a regulatory body operate with different
powers in discharging different tasks, they will tend to construct risks
differently.41
Managerial constraints also affect risk constructions. As Douglas has
observed, risk managers tend to select for attention those risks that they
think they can manage.42 When operations are complex and risks numerous,
judgements necessarily have to be made on risk groupings so as to produce
operationally manageable and effective regimes. This will involve the
creative distillation by the regulator of the various laws it has to implement
into a smaller number of overriding objectives that it can then use to
organize its activities. In the mid 2000s, for example, the Netherlands
environmental regulator, VROM, was charged with over 270 specific
legislative tasks. A key stage in developing its risk-based framework was,
therefore, to synthesize this legislative morass into four different types of
harms and work programmes.43 In England the Care Quality Commission
(CQC) has recently gone through a similar exercise after struggling to create
an effective risk-based system of inspections of the quality of care in
hospitals, care homes, GPs, and dentists. It distilled its objectives into five
core elements: ensuring care is safe, effective, caring, responsible, and well-
led.44 Such distillations, moreover, may still leave scope for further
managerial judgements. Thus, selected objectives can conflict, so that trade-
offs have to be made (care may be effective but not caring, for example, and
vice versa).
The funding structure of a regulator can also structure risk prioritizations.
In environmental regulation in the United Kingdom and Ireland, regulators
are funded by licence fees collected from the regulated parties.45 Those in
higher risk categories pay higher fees. There is, therefore, an in-built reason
575
41 Hood, Rothstein, and Baldwin, op. cit., n. 33, pp. 24±6; B. Hutter and S. Lloyd-
Bostock, `Field-Level Perceptions of Risk in Regulatory Agencies' in Short and
Clarke, op. cit., n. 13.
42 M. Douglas, Risk and Blame (1992); P. Goodwin and G. Wright, Decision Analysis
for Management Judgement (2004) 300.
43 J. Black, `Constructing and contesting legitimacy and accountability in polycentric
regulatory regimes' (2008) 2 Regulation & Governance 137.
44 Care Quality Commission, Raising standards, putting people first ± Our strategy for
2013 to 2016 (2013).
45 Fee levels for the Environment Agency, for example, are set on a cost-recovery
basis ± see National Audit Office, Effective inspection and enforcement: imple-
menting the Hampton vision in the Environment Agency (2008) 13. The Health and
Safety Executive (HSE) has, since October 2012, operated a Fee for Intervention
(FFI) cost recovery scheme in which non-compliers are liable for costs of
inspection, enforcement, and so on (Health and Safety (Fees) Regulations 2012).
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not to lower the risk categorization of any one operator. The funding model,
moreover, drives the agencies into inspection-based modes of intervention,
spending time on site, as regulated operators want to see that they are
`getting their money's worth' from the regulator.46 Such modes of
intervention, in turn, are liable to shape particular ways of constructing
risks: in many cases, regulators will look to risks that occur at individual
sites rather than arise from more general practices, since addressing risks on
a sectoral or system-wide basis is harder to implement when the agency is
funded on an individualized cost-recovery model. Resource pressures can
drive risk identifications in yet another way. Regulatory managers who are
aware that resources will follow key risks may, as a result, manipulate risk
identifications and prioritization in a bidding war for resources between
organizational units.47
The roles performed by regulatory actors within an agency can, in addi-
tion, structure risk identifications and can lead to divergences of approach
across a regulatory body. Thus, regulatory managers may not see risks in the
same way as field enforcers or front-line supervisors. In the health and safety
fields, for instance, there is evidence that inspectors on the ground tend to
see risks in safety (rather than health) terms to a far greater degree than their
managers.48 Inspectors' perceptions and constructions of risk are liable to be
shaped by the visibility and tangibility of the problems they encounter, and
by personal experiences (for example, traumatic accident investigations).49
These experiences are not likely to be reproduced at head office, where
regulatory personnel are at some distance from the coalface.50 Similarly, the
ways in which tasks are allocated and defined in organizations will also play
a part in shaping risk selections. Thus, when roles were created for `chief risk
officers' in the 1990s financial sector, this both reflected and institu-
tionalized a specific approach to identifying and dealing with risks.51 More
generally, distributions of skills and organizational functions within an
organization also provide framing structures for risk and problem identifica-
tion ± as where an agency is divided into legal, investigative, and specialist
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46 Interviews with environmental inspectors conducted by the authors as part of the
SNIFFER project, on file with authors. See R. Baldwin and J. Black, Development
of Regulatory Approaches to Low Risk Sites and Development of a Good Practice
Framework: Final Project Report (2011).
47 Black, op. cit., n. 34.
48 B. Hutter, `Ways of Seeing: Understandings of Risks in Organizational Settings' in
Hutter and Power, op. cit., n. 13.
49 A manifestation of the availability bias: see A. Tversky and D. Kahneman,
`Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability' (1973) 5
Cognitive Psychology 207, at 221.
50 See Hutter and Lloyd-Bostock, op. cit., n. 13; D. Nelkin and M. Brown, Workers at
Risk (1984).
51 M. Power, `Organizational Responses to Risk: the Rise of the Chief Risk Officer' in
Power and Hutter, op. cit., n. 13.
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risk units, or where there are competing specialisms (engineers versus
biologists, or lawyers versus healthcare specialists).52
Functional considerations, moreover, can lead regulators to organize risks
in a way that reflects the industrial or commercial structures that they
encounter.53 British environment agencies, for example, have often focused
on the risks posed by particular sites rather than particular activities, because
sites are often dispersed and the range of activities undertaken at those sites
is frequently highly varied. A regulator's established regime for collecting
information can also mould risk identification. The systems and processes
that organizations put into place for management purposes, and those that
they use for gathering information on risks, will often be closely linked.54 An
aspect of this linkage is that risks are often constructed from, and accord-
ingly shaped by, the processes that supply information to the regulator and
which create methods of communication.55 Regulators, it can be said, will
often choose the pragmatic path of `collecting data which is collectable'.56
Information that is gathered on this basis will be structured around an
assumed, and particular, breakdown of risks with the effect that these risks
will be treated as relevant risks and the information will be given weight in a
self-validating process.57
Operational factors, in addition, can induce regulators to focus on fre-
quently occurring or immediate events of relatively low impact rather than
on issues which are important but less often encountered or more distant in
time. Here the difference, and indeed the tension, between focusing on
problems and focusing on risks come to the fore. Inquiries into mining and
chemical disasters have found that health and safety inspectors tend to focus
on occupational safety problems such as slips and trips rather than low-
probability but high-impact events such as explosions (which are more
properly risks).58 Investigations of failures to monitor the prudential risks of
banks have also revealed that regulators have attended to immediate
problems (in the FSA's case, mis-selling of retail financial products and the
continuing policy implications of the failure of an insurance company) and
devoted little time to issues considered to present a low-probability risk,
notwithstanding the potential (and actual) high impact of bank failure.59
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52 See Sparrow, op. cit. (2008), n. 2, p. 48. The same effect can be produced across
institutional frameworks and settings ± see Buncefield Report, op. cit., n. 36.
53 A point made in relation to large-scale pig farms in Ireland ± EPA interview 2013.
54 As noted above, risks and management approaches, it can be said, are not
independent but co-produced: Hutter and Power, op. cit., n. 13, p. 9.
55 B. Hutter, Risk and Regulation (2001); C. Heimer, `Your Baby's Just Fine' in Short
and Clarke, op. cit., n. 13, p. 187; Sparrow, op. cit. (2008), n. 2, pp. 49±55.
56 Power, op. cit., n. 13, p. 116.
57 This is, of course a syndrome that enhances model risk ± the risk that the model
itself is flawed: see Black, op. cit., n. 6, pp. 185±224.
58 Pike River Report, op. cit., n. 36; Buncefield Report, op. cit., n. 36.
59 FSA, The Failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland: Financial Services Authority
Board Report (2011) 262.
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Dealing with problems in the here and now can occupy so much attention
and resources that risks that may materialize in the future fail to be dealt with
in a strategic way.
3. Political, communicative, and reputational factors
Regulators, even legally independent regulators, need a political licence to
operate. They have to maintain their reputations and legitimacy in the eyes
of a wide range of legitimacy communities, who are often making competing
demands on them. Their accountability relationships are multiplied where
the regulators are located within a multi-level governance structure.60 Most
United Kingdom regulators are situated within an EU regulatory regime, and
many (though not necessarily the same group) are nested within global
regulatory structures, such as Codex Alimentarius for food safety, the
International Maritime Organization for maritime safety, or the global com-
mittees of financial regulators or competition regulators.
The accountability and legitimacy requirements imposed on regulators
can play an important role in structuring risk identification, assessment, and
prioritization. Thus, the environmental regulators in the United Kingdom and
Ireland include, in their risk-based frameworks, those emissions to air and
discharges to water and sewers which they are required to report on to the
European Environment Agency.61 They are legally instructed to collect this
information, and this, in turn, brings the relevant risks onto the agenda in a
`packaged' form. Similarly, the application, within government, of perform-
ance indicators (such as safety or environmental targets) will often impose
frameworks that regulators will feel driven to reflect in their own risk con-
structions and priorities.62 Political priorities also shift, requiring regulators
to take into account new and different risks, though rarely allowing them to
drop old ones.
More generally, Douglas has argued that classifications of risks tend to
reflect the regimes that are established for rendering account and holding to
blame.63 The players of the `blame game', moreover, are likely to consider
issues of potential blame attribution when deciding which categorizations of
risk they will assume responsibility for controlling.64 `Risks' can thus be
recognized, constructed, and prioritized with reference to the operating systems
for ascribing responsibility and allocating blame.65 This is, moreover, a
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60 See Black, op. cit., n. 34.
61 For a discussion of the influence of the EU in dealing with risks from septic tanks in
Ireland, see Baldwin et al., op. cit., n. 18.
62 See Hutter, op. cit., n. 55, p. 268.
63 See M. Douglas, `Risk and Blame' in Douglas, op. cit., n. 42.
64 C. Hood, `The Risk Game and the Blame Game' (2002) Government and
Opposition 15.
65 See Power, op. cit., n. 13, p. 113.
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reflexive process. Modes of holding to account, measurement methodologies
for evaluating performance, and risk identifications are all matters that structure
and reinforce each other: `Definitions, responsibilities, concepts of error and of
loss, and potential risk management jurisdictions are mutually constitutive.'66
Regulators also need a social licence, in other words to be seen as
legitimate in the eyes of different social groups or legitimacy communities.
Different groupings within society, however, will tend to frame risks dif-
ferently.67 Those groups will reflect a variety of economic or political
interests and they are likely to seek to induce the regulator to frame risks in a
particular manner.68 A key contention of social amplification theory is that a
variety of social amplification stations, such as scientists, the media, and
government agencies, filter signals about risks and, in doing so, either
intensify or attenuate aspects of risks.69 Such filtering systems will operate,
sometimes in competition, sometimes in a mutually reinforcing manner, to
establish risk priorities.70 Regulators who are concerned to sustain support
for their actions will tend to categorize risks in ways that respond to public
(or group or industry) perceptions of risk and their respective expectations of
the regulator.71 The Food Standards Agency in England and the United
Kingdom Health and Safety Executive, for example, takes into account
public attitudes to risk, as well as their statutory objectives, in identifying
which risks they should focus on. In Ireland, the Irish Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has included odour as a `risk' that merits focus
because unwanted odours give rise to a considerable volume of complaints ±
illustrating also the conflation in practice of `risks' and `problems'.72
Governmental pressures to regulate in certain ways can also drive the
framing of risk identifications. Thus, if a government presses a regulator to
help small enterprises by adopting an increasingly `one-stop shop' approach
to regulation,73 this will tend to favour interventions at specific sites and the
addressing of numbers of risks at single visits to those sites (a process often
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66 id., p. 120.
67 O. Renn, Risk Governance (2008) 47.
68 id., p. 65. See, also, J. Portz, `Plant Closings, Community Definitions, and the Local
Response' in Rochefort and Cobb, op. cit., n. 13; F. Baumgartner, Conflict and
Rhetoric in French Policymaking (1989).
69 See R. Kasperson et al., `The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Frame-
work' (1988) 8 Risk Analysis 177.
70 See Pidgeon et al., op cit., n. 20, p. 114; H. Otway and B. Wynne, `Risk
Communication: Paradigm and Paradox' (1989) 9 Risk Analysis 141.
71 Hood et al., op. cit., n. 33, p. 64.
72 The majority of complaints that the EPA receives regarding licensed IPPC and waste
sites relate to nuisance odours: see EPA, Air Guidance Note 5 (AG5) Odour Impact
Assessment Guidance for EPA Licensed Sites, at <www.epa.ie/pubs/advice/air/
emissions/AG5-V11.pdf> 6.
73 See the Hampton review on reducing numbers of inspections and the numbers of
different regulators that deal with businesses: P. Hampton, Reducing Administrative
Burdens: Effective Inspection and Enforcement (2005) 55±69.
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advocated by regulated firms). Such a regulator will be driven by this logic
to categorize risks with reference to particular sites rather than to assess risks
on a sectoral or systemic basis. Political or reputational risks to the regulator
itself can be a further factor in framing risks. In VROM's framework, for
example, `social impacts' were a separate category of impact that captures
issues that have current political and media salience. Regulators' political
risks could thus be incorporated into both the categorization of risks and the
measurement of risks.74
The nature of the harm, and the particular susceptibility to harm of certain
categories of individuals or environmental sites, can also be an important
driver of risk prioritizations. In a `pure' risk model, probability and impact
will be equally weighted but, in practice, risk-based models vary con-
siderably in the role that impact plays in driving risk prioritization decisions.
Impacts that are of high political salience or public sensitivity will thus be
given special weightings in setting risk priorities. Impacts on large numbers
of people, for example, are often categorized as high-risk even for low-
probability events. In some contexts, this approach can move attention away
from looking at risks in aggregate (for example, overall pollution in a
catchment area) to a focus on specific kinds of impact (as with fish-kills in a
given watercourse). In other contexts, the issue of aggregation will loom
large because it is aggregation that triggers the harm (as where air quality
crosses a tolerance or acceptability threshold). The United Kingdom Food
Standards Agency's risk evaluation framework, for example, looks to both
the nature of the micro-organisms that are present in the food and the number
of people likely to consume the food. The Health and Safety Executive's risk
framework also combines consideration of the nature of the harm, the
probability of its occurring, and the number of people likely to be affected.
The distribution of the harm may thus have a political significance that
affects its classification and prioritization ± where it impacts on areas or
parties of special concern. The Solicitors Regulation Authority provides
another example. It includes vulnerability of consumers of legal services in
its impact assessment: thus those seeking immigration and asylum advice are
deemed more vulnerable than those seeking advice on commercial contracts,
and risks to the former are prioritized accordingly.75 The United Kingdom
financial regulators have modified their approaches over the last few years to
adjust their focus on the aggregate scale of impacts so as to give more weight
to the nature of the impact. Accordingly, the Financial Conduct Authority
has a higher tolerance of financial loss for non-retail customers than it does
for retail consumers.76
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74 On regulators' sensitivities to blame as a factor in selecting risks, see J. Black, `The
Role of Risk in Regulatory Processes' in Baldwin et al., op. cit., n. 4; Douglas, op.
cit., n. 31.
75 Solicitors Regulation Authority, Risk Framework (2014).
76 FCA, How the Financial Conduct Authority will report on and investigate
regulatory failure (2013).
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4. Summary
Risks and `problems' are thus conceived of in different ways under the
influence of a variety of drivers. When there is mutual constitution, the
drivers reinforce each other ± as when the rules break down risks in a manner
that corresponds to the political priorities of the community affected by
regulation. When there is competition, the messages provided by the
different drivers often favour different breakdowns of risk priorities. This
can produce tensions within regimes ± as when the rules impose a charging
regime based on site-based inspections, there is, accordingly, a highlighting
of existing risks at individual sites, and this hinders the addressing of those
emergent and systemic risks that operational and reputational considerations
would draw attention to. As cultural theory emphasizes, drivers vary in
strength and different combinations of weaker and stronger drivers produce
distinct approaches to risk identification and to regulatory challenges. Com-
petitions between drivers can also change regimes over time ± as when
operational drivers of risk identification are trumped by new laws so that the
`risks' that were addressed in establishing a control regime in the field are
not the same `risks' as those that constitute the legal focus of attention some
years later, or when social and/or political priorities change.77
THE OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES POSED BY INTERACTING
DRIVERS
Interactions between different drivers and shapers of risk and problem
identification, selection, and prioritization can present regulators with a
number of functional and procedural challenges.78
1. Functional challenges
Risks, as discussed above, are commonly analysed, ordered, managed, and
controlled in a manner consistent with a `rational-instrumental' model of
administration.79 Risk decisions, within such an approach, are based on
analyses of the risks to regulatory objectives that are presented by different
sites or activities.80
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77 See, also, Sparrow, op. cit. (2008), n. 2, p. 98.
78 Not considered here are `constitutional' and `justice' benchmarks of regulatory
legitimacy, see Black, op. cit., n. 43, pp. 137±64; on evaluating regulation generally,
see R. Baldwin, M. Cave, and M. Lodge, Understanding Regulation (2012) ch. 3.
79 See Fisher, op. cit., n. 29. As noted in the text to fn. 29, a `deliberative-constitutive'
paradigm of regulatory administration would favour a less mechanical use of
mandates in setting risk priorities.
80 See Black, op. cit., n. 34.
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A central problem with the rational-instrumental model is that moving
from a statement of statutory objectives to a set of key risks, to a breakdown
of more specific risks is not a mechanical process ± it involves a host of
discretionary and value-laden decisions. The discussion above reveals that,
in making such decisions, regulators may be impacted by a broad array of
drivers beyond legal mandates, from theories, ideas, and discourses, to
managerial, functional, and bureaucratic pressures, to information, com-
munications and data systems, accountability structures, political pressures,
and sensitivities regarding certain impacts.
The results may be sub-optimal ± as was seen in the pre-2008 financial
services sector when the serving of objectives was undermined by a host of
pressures. The `rational-instrumental' operation of risk-based regulation did
little to ensure that key systemic risks were identified and selected for
priority attention.81
This is not to suggest that a `deliberative-constitutive' approach, with its
stress on flexibility and deliberation, would offer an easy means for a risk-
based regulator to deal with complex competitions between different drivers
of risk identification. It does, however, invite the regulator to address,
directly, such competitions and to do so in an ongoing and transparent way.
What cannot be assumed, of course, is that all of the various actors in a risk-
regulation regime will subscribe to the same vision of administration ± be
that `rational-instrumental', `deliberative-constitutive' or some other. As
noted above, competitions between these visions will themselves produce
different perceptions of risk priorities.
Competitions between drivers will, in addition, bring the danger that
regulators who are carrying out different tasks within the same agency may
be addressing differently conceived `risks'.82 The result of such `framing
differences' may well be a degree of ineffectiveness, uncertainty, and
friction. Similar difficulties arise when staff with different skills, disciplinary
backgrounds, and roles may construct risks differently even when operating
within the same organization under one mandate.
Where numbers of regulators act in an area, and numbers of pieces of
legislation are involved, there is considerable potential for problematic
divergence on risk constructions. Let us assume, for example, that numerous
farmers are using a chemical in their sheep-dips that poses risks to water-
courses and groundwater (potentially killing invertebrates in rivers and
affecting drinking water quality in other locations). The activity clearly
poses risks to the environment, to animal health, and to human health. Each
one of these harms, however, may well be subject to different legal regimes,
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81 In cultural theory terms it might be argued that this was a `high grid, low group'
scenario in which a lack of group coherence undermined the consistent application
of rules and norms.
82 On the main tasks of regulation, see R. Baldwin and J. Black, `Really Responsive
Regulation' (2008) 71 Modern Law Rev. 59.
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and these may or may not be the responsibilities of more than one regulator.
An environmental regulator will see the use of the chemical as an environ-
mental risk; a health and safety regulator as a risk to human health. Not only
will each construct the risk differently, they may afford it a different priority.
Lack of regulatory co-ordination and effectiveness may result, as has been
seen in practice. Thus, the `risks' of genetically modified organisms have
been variously characterized in a multitude of ways which are largely
irreconcilable, including as risks to human health, risks to the environment,
risks to the business model of farming, and/or risks to a way of life. In the
Buncefield case, where vapour released from a petrol storage tank caused a
significant explosion, the two regulators of the Buncefield site, the Health
and Safety Executive (HSE) and the Environment Agency, prioritized the
risks posed by the site differently with respect to their mandates, with the
HSE giving it a higher priority than the EA. This, in turn, led to conflicts in
the operation of the joint inspection regime that the regulators were required
to adopt, and to a recommendation that they provide a common risk ranking
for sites they jointly regulated.83
Competitions between drivers produce a particular challenge for problem-
centred regulation: how problem-centred work can be carried out within the
context of the regulator's other operations. (A risk-based system, in contrast,
can in principle be rolled out across all of the agency's different operations.)
Sparrow suggests, as noted, the establishment of an `organizational inter-
face' between problem-centred work and other types of activity (for
example, process-driven interventions) so that `all the proper interactions
between them can be understood and facilitated.'84 He concludes that
managers must always appreciate the distinctive nature of problem-centred
work but they must prevent it from `becoming detached from the remainder
of operations.'85
Such prescriptions, however, do not in themselves serve to identify the
proper scope and extent of the problem-centred regime. The irony is that, in
practice, the boundaries between problem-centred and other forms of work
are liable to be contested by the same sets of drivers as will compete to
define the `problems' at issue. Thus, a strong `political sensitivity' driver
may both focus attention on a particular outcome (for example, a fish-kill)
and it may drive regulatory managers to see this harm as an issue to be
addressed by establishing a project team. In contrast, a mode of information
collection that is linked to a set of legal enforcement powers may lead
regulators to slice and dice problems according to the framework established
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83 See Buncefield Report, op. cit., n. 36 on the policy and procedures of the Health and
Safety Executive's and the Environment Agency's role in regulating the activities
on the Buncefield site under the COMAH Regulations (especially recommendations
4, 17, and 18).
84 Sparrow, op. cit. (2008), n. 2, p. 157.
85 id., p. 165.
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by that set of powers. Problem-centred regulation could, in the latter
situation, operate in a manner consistent with a process-driven rather than a
problem-centred approach.
Sparrow suggests that where there is organizational embedding of his
approach, there is no ambiguity about `carefully identified problems'. A
concern, however, is that there will always tend to be ambiguity about the
nature of the key problems the regulator faces because of competitions
between drivers of both problem and risk selection. Given the array of
competing drivers outlined above, it is optimistic to think that problem-
centred regulators can establish authoritative constructions of `important
problems' without overcoming severe challenges. Embedding a problem-
centred, or indeed a risk-based, approach also involves the fostering of a
consistent conception of key problems or risks throughout a regulatory body.
Sparrow notes that, when defining a problem precisely, choices have to be
made, multiple and competing perspectives have to be considered, and
negotiations undertaken on the framing of a problem.86 He suggests, never-
theless, that a precise (authoritative) problem definition can be produced.
Sparrow contends that dedicated project teams can in some contexts usefully
focus on `the identification and calibration, and mitigation of a wide range of
risk exposures',87 but the above discussion highlights the difficulties of
fostering common, unambiguous conceptions of key problems across dif-
ferent organizational departments, skills, operations, sectors, and tasks, not
to mention different political and accountability contexts. A further issue is
whether common understandings can be sustained over time as different
units wrestle with their particular, and evolving, implementation challenges.
These problems are compounded when regulators have to interact with other
agencies who have different remits in the operation of the regulatory regime.
Here it is worth noting the experience of the Scottish Environmental
Protection Agency (SEPA) since this is a United Kingdom agency that has
explicitly sought to reform its regulatory approach along the lines advocated
by Malcolm Sparrow. Starting in 2009, SEPA addressed the challenge of
embedding a new problem-centred approach in a series of stages.88 Theo-
retical, operational, and political considerations played their own distinct
roles in the SEPA response. In the first instance, a group of senior SEPA
staff reviewed key issues and priorities in 2009±10 and identified around a
half-dozen projects as candidates for a `problem-based' approach. The
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88 This account is based on SEPA publications supplemented by semi-structured
interviews (conducted in December 2013) with a small number of SEPA managers
and policy makers who were selected for their close knowledge of and/or
involvement in the SEPA regulatory reform programme. Central publications
referred to are: SEPA, Response to the Better Environmental Regulation: SEPA's
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following year this group sought to place `key problem' identification onto a
stronger evidential basis to avoid dangers that the `pet projects of the loudest
shouters' would be prioritized. A broad range of managers was accordingly
canvassed concerning key areas and their suggestions were analysed. The top
ten issues were then identified and these were whittled down in number.
Officials were asked to justify and re-evaluate the selection of these priority
projects, and this resulted in the selection of six or seven projects for taking
forward.89
A benefit of this broad consultative process was seen to be its generation
of staff buy-in. Political considerations of an internal nature, however,
impacted on the selection of projects in so far as senior staff decided to
spread the projects across different sectors within the organization so as to
avoid seeming to favour certain groups.90 SEPA's reforms also demanded
coordinations and agenda alignments with other agencies. Thus, environ-
mental crime might have been a continuing SEPA priority, but this was not
necessarily the case for the police. As one senior SEPA manager argued,
problem solving forces a regulator into the kinds of engagement that are
needed to deal with such coordination issues. Just as internal political
pressuress led SEPA managers to `spread projects' when establishing risk
priorities, external pressures demanded close engagements with other
agencies whose collaboration was needed to gain a common alignment of
priorities on particular issues.91
The next stage of problem identification was to seek more data from
external sources. SEPA focused on needs to consult stakeholders such as
businesses and local authorities about key problems; to obtain the correct
data to set priorities; and to secure the resources required to analyse the data
obtained through consultation.92
Once the issues for priority attention had been identified, the managerial
challenge was to coordinate a focus on problems with attention to other tasks
or `business as usual'. This required planning within SEPA and `sign-off
from the top'. Resource considerations also loomed large in SEPA's move to
a problem focus. The shift was designed to stimulate the more effective
production of desired regulatory outcomes but it was recognized that it
required a good deal of staff training and the approval of resources for key
projects.93 Resourcing, indeed became a central focus for discussion ± as one
senior manager said, `Competition for resources is now a key issue.
Discussions tend not to dispute the merits of the work but the priority issue:
and resource limitations make prioritizing more urgent.'94
585
89 SEPA staff interview, December 2013.
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92 Interview December 2013 and see SEPA, op. cit. (2011), n. 88, pp. 8±10.
93 Interview December 2013 and see SEPA, id.
94 SEPA staff interview, December 2013.
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Overall, SEPA's efforts suggest that a good deal of managerial commit-
ment, and leadership, is required if the respective roles of `problem' and of
`process' work are to be understood and accepted within and across organi-
zations. Its experience also suggests that competitions for resources will
often lie at the heart of discussions on the respective scopes of these kinds of
work.
Competitions between drivers of identification also give rise to more
particular challenges in relation to the central tasks of regulation, namely,
setting objectives, gathering data or information, developing regulatory
strategies to affect behaviour, enforcing, evaluating performance, and
modifying in the light of that performance evaluation.95
(a) Establishing clear regulatory objectives
Risk-based approaches are focused primarily on ensuring that a regulator
meets its objectives. Those objectives, however, may be at tension, requiring
regulators to make trade-offs between them. Moreover, the objectives may
be ill-specified. Regulators may be charged to implement multiple pieces of
legislation or delegated legislation and will need to `translate' those provi-
sions into objectives in order to operationalize the risk-based approach. Risk
identifications, selections, and prioritizations, accordingly, may be based on
interpretations of multiple specifications of legal mandates, as well as on the
basis of the other theoretical, operational, and political/reputational drivers
noted above. Putting objectives into operation involves the promulgation of
those objectives throughout the regulatory organization. General risk objec-
tives will have to be translated into sub-risks (smaller clusters of risky
activities) that can be a focus of implementation measures. Challenges arise
here because different departments or units within an agency are likely to
select and construct sub-risks differently, particularly if there is no co-
ordinating cross-organizational conversation. Variation can be horizontal,
with different regional offices having different modes of categorization and
ranking, and/or vertical, with differences between front-line officials and
those in the higher echelons of policy and management. The overall effect is
that objectives can be seen in different ways across the organization as risks
are categorized and dealt with differently. Agencies' aims, as a result, are
liable to be fragmented and difficult to bring together into a coherent regime.
(b) Detecting and information gathering
Data is critical to any risk-based regulatory regime. In order to assess the
probability of a risk crystallizing and the impact if it does, regulators have to
create risk indicators and collect data to enable them to assess a state of
affairs with respect to those indicators. The scale of the issue should not be
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underestimated. The CQC at one point had 1000 outcome measures, assess-
ment of which required the analysis of 1.2m quantitative data items and
100,000 qualitative data items.96 The problems in utilizing such a significant
amount of data are compounded if different indicators, which the data items
are meant to inform, are rooted in framing differences.
The special danger is that framing differences produce flawed data. Risk
analysts within regulators (and their risk models) commonly have to rely on
information supplied by field inspectors. If the latter categorize risks with
reference to operational considerations such as local sensitivities to certain
harms, the danger is that they will not deliver information that is organized
according to the same framings of risks as those used by the analysts. To
give a simple example: in the hypothetical sheep-dip example discussed, the
danger is that the policy makers will look to gather information on risks of
non-compliance with individual farm discharge consents, but the field
inspectors will be focused on risks to watercourses (because of local political
concerns). One way to address this is to give inspectors or supervisors check
lists to inspect against, as the HSE did with its `topic packs' and the CQC has
done with its `general lines of enquiry' for inspectors. Such responses can,
however, raise issues regarding the scope that is allowed to inspectors to use
their judgement or to capture indicators or concerns which are `off-list'.97 If
they do not have such scope, they may fail to address or detect new
challenges. Conversely, inspectors may collect information with reference to
the risks that they see as relevant within their own framing mechanisms, but
the messages sent from the field will not impact at the policy level because
they relate to matters that are not on the policy agenda.
(c) Responding through strategy development
It is difficult to develop regulatory strategies with a clear sense of purpose in
the face of concurrent and competing framings of risk. This is liable to be the
case, not least, because the information available to strategists will tend to be
fragmented for the reasons discussed above and it will tend to be com-
partmentalized (in a number of different) ways that reflect the particular
purposes for which it was collected.
When different drivers act in a mutually reinforcing manner, this can lead
to circular reasoning. Strategies will be developed with reference to `given'
risks that have been shaped by a mixture of legal obligations, enforcement
methods and powers, political pressures, and data systems. As a result, the
regulators will employ new strategies and tools to address those risks rather
than rethink the ways in which they construct and prioritize risks. They will,
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perhaps unwittingly, be posing to themselves such questions as: `Which
intervention methods are best used in relation to the risks that we have
constructed with reference to our intervention methods?' The effect will be
that their reform efforts will tend to create a new world in the image of the
old one and that structural problems will be unaddressed.98
(d) Enforcing
The combination, in practice, of theoretical, operational, and political drivers
of risk identification explains why field inspectors or front-line supervisors
have, in many scenarios, to square the circle. They have to serve the
objectives and address the risks that policy makers have identified, but they
have reconcile their own visions of risks with those of policy officials. As
noted, field operators will tend to identify and prioritize risks with reference
to such matters as available resources, relevant business configurations, local
political considerations, and past field experiences. They are generally less
attentive to macro-political issues than head-office policy makers.99 In such
situations, the regulators' risk-based models become the fictions that firms'
compliance plans can be: they exist in theory but in practice the organization
adopts quite different approaches, as was the case with FSA supervision, as
noted above.
When regulators seek to take formal enforcement action such as impose
fines or institute prosecutions, they will then have to reconfigure the risk
according to a legal framework. As Hawkins's research illustrates, what field
officers may see as the relevant set of risks, and the correct data to support
their claim, may not be the same as is recognized in law: events have to be
reconstructed from the language of risk into one of duties and liabilities.100
A particular challenge arises when the regulator has redefined its objec-
tives through a distillation and interpretation of its legislative framework.
Such distillation may facilitate the development of policy and inspection
priorities, but when the regulator wants to take enforcement action, it has to
go back to the legislative framework. That framework may drive risk and
problem identifications in a manner that is inconsistent with the political/
policy drivers espoused by the regulator under a risk-based or outcomes-
focused approach. Furthermore, other factors may come into play in
determining when and whether to take enforcement action. As a result,
multiple frameworks may be operating simultaneously.
To return to the experience of SEPA, when it sought to move away from a
regime in which the statutory framework drove risk identification, it saw this
as shifting from a focus on `box ticking inspection programmes and from
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permit compliance' towards a targeting of `key environmental harms'.101
The `key-harms' approach, however, did not determine enforcement
priorities. When targeting enforcement resources, SEPA suggested that risk
priorities would be established with reference to an analysis of regulated
operator types.102 Operators were to be classified with reference to a site-
based assessment of their performance in adhering to relevant licence
conditions under the statutory Pollution Prevention and Control regime.103
The `problem focus', said SEPA, would not replace routine regulatory work
on licensing, inspecting, and so on, since this was necessary to protect and
improve the environment and comply with European law. In practice,
problem solving meant: `gathering intelligence on specific harms and
intervening to solve them'.104 It was also anticipated that field enforcement
would, at least to a degree, be structured by the legal powers that inspectors
are given under different statutes.
The structure of the legal regime therefore posed considerable challenges
for SEPA in seeking to construct an `integrated' regime around key impacts
and outcomes. From 2009 onwards, SEPA argued that a new legislative
regime was required in order to overcome the difficulty of applying different
laws to the four regimes controlling air, water, waste, and radioactive
substances. In SEPA's words, the fourfold division of regulatory efforts had
resulted `in duties and definitions that are not aligned. It makes them
complex to understand and administer and results in multiple permissions,
multiple inspections . . .'.105 SEPA saw a move away from the `four-regimes'
model to be a pre-condition for not only a more targeted regulatory approach
but also a lower-cost regime (involving, inter alia, `single permissions' for
sites and the issue of permits at the corporate level).106
The challenges involved in relegislating were not inconsiderable. A
central difficulty for SEPA was that its funding was tied to charging under
the permitting and related systems within the four legislative regimes that
were in place. A move to problem solving demanded, therefore, a new
funding model, with new cross-subsidies or new funding streams and
charging with reference to risks and operators' performance levels.107 When
SEPA published its proposals for new legislation in 2012, these were
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designed to offer such flexible funding and also reforms of enforcement
powers so as to offer a `joined-up and flexible range of sanctions' that was
consistent with a risk-based, outcome-focused approach.108 (The Regulatory
Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 was the end-product of these proposals.)109
SEPA conceded, however, that the grip of the existing legal framework
could not easily be broken: a completely integrated regulatory approach was
not possible due to the specific requirements of some EU Directives.110
How, in summary, did SEPA deal with the tension between different
drivers of problem identification? In the first instance, SEPA senior staff
identified key problems on their own account. They then sought to pinpoint
problems through a broad process of consultation across the organization's
managers. At a third stage of their approach, a more technocratic approach
was adopted, in which there was reliance on data collection and on the
judgement of senior managers. It was said within SEPA, `we trust managers
to identify the key issues to be attended to'.111
SEPA's experience, nevertheless, emphasizes how strongly existing
constellations of legal rules, information systems, and distributions of skills
will all tend to impact on conceptions of risks and problems for the purposes
of intervention. SEPA aimed to develop a coherent, integrated, and cross-
mandate approach to risk identification and assessment but it was saddled
with the legacies of both domestic and EU rules. Further operational diffi-
culties for SEPA included dealing with the funding implications of moving
away from the charging regimes structured by the extant legislation; meshing
its new prioritization of key problems with ongoing demands to maintain
`business as usual' in key areas; and effecting desired reforms within given
resource constraints.
(e) Assessing performance
A supposed strength of risk-based regulation is that risk scores offer a ready
means of calculating regulatory successes and failures. Average risk scores
in a sector, for instance, can be added-up annually and comparisons made
year on year. If, however, theoretical, operational, and political drivers
compete, risks will be constructed in numbers of ways and this will make
comparisons between risks difficult. `What is being scored' becomes a
central issue ± is it the individual company, the type of risk, the particular
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type of harm, the risk to agency reputation, and so on?112 Even, moreover, if
the target of risk evaluations is clear (for example, there is attention to
individual operators) questions still have to be answered on how the risks
that such targets give rise to should be identified: `Risks to what?' becomes
the issue.
(f) Modifying approaches and the challenge of change
For regulators a constant challenge is to respond dynamically to new issues
and to break out of the chains of the past. For risk-based regulators, the
difficulty that is often referred to is that of `model myopia' ± the tendency to
act on the basis of risks that have been identified and assessed by established
systems.113 Regulatory responsiveness demands that agency strategists
receive information regarding new risks and risk creators. As noted above,
however, such information may be difficult to generate or transmit for a
number of reasons. Legal mandates may be blind to particular risks as they
do not relate to objectives as interpreted at a given time; theoretical
perspectives and cognitive framings may exclude such risks; operational
factors can mean that data is not collected on them and political/reputational
concerns may not include them as issues for prioritization.
2. Procedural challenges: communications about risk
Many of the points made in discussing substantive challenges bring asso-
ciated procedural difficulties, and competitions between drivers of risk
identification can produce markedly negative impacts on regulators'
attempts to justify themselves to politicians and the public. A first difficulty
flows from the already noted tendency for differently-placed regulatory staff
to construct risks differently. This propensity can be expected to lead to two
issues. Managers face a challenge in ensuring that there are clear and con-
vincing communications on risks throughout their organizations and, in
addition, problems may be encountered in sending consistent communica-
tions about priorities to those beyond the regulatory body. Risk-based
regulatory approaches hold out the promise that the regulators will be able to
justify their selections of priorities on the basis of rational and systematic
decision making. This will be difficult if divergent messages on risk
priorities are delivered by regulators, policymakers, enforcement officials,
regulatory lawyers, and other staff members.
A second set of justificatory difficulties is liable to arise when the various
drivers of risk identification impact differently on the regulatory body and on
the public. Public perceptions of risk are often shaped by complex com-
binations of personal experience, media amplification, and normative judge-
591
112 See Beaussier et al., op. cit., n. 96.
113 There may also be system blindness to particular risks: see Black, op. cit., n. 6.
ß 2016 The Author. Journal of Law and Society ß 2016 Cardiff University Law School
ments. Popular conceptions of risk, moreover, often differ from technical
assessments, as is well noted in the risk literature. As for the regulators, the
above discussion indicates that their own constructions of risks are not
necessarily based solely on technical assessments but may be driven by a
range of factors, from theories, ideas, and discourses, to managerial, func-
tional, and bureaucratic pressures, to information, communications and data
systems, accountability structures, political pressures, and sensitivities
regarding certain impacts. As a result, there are likely to be instances when
the regulators' identifications, selections, and prioritizations of risks differ in
a pronounced fashion from those of the public. A common example concerns
the risks of road deaths as compared to those caused by train or plane
crashes. Similarly, when regulators assess operators as `high-risk', this cate-
gorization is often driven by factors that impact far more strongly on
regulators than on those outside the control regime. As a result, the
regulator's risk categorizations can be difficult for firms and the public to
understand and accept.114
Regulators may be especially sensitive to political drivers of risk
identification when they come under pressure to explain their actions in the
wake of a regulatory failure. What constitutes a regulatory failure can,
however, be seen differently by different constituencies under the impact of
different drivers of risk identification, selection, and prioritization. The
United Kingdom financial regulators created after the crisis are now under a
statutory duty to report on `regulatory failures' and the Financial Conduct
Authority (FCA) has issued a document on what, in its view, constitutes a
regulatory failure. It defines `failure' in terms of aggregate consumer
detriment: a loss of under £30m is not a failure, but one of over £150m is. As
for losses between those two figures, whether or not they constitute failures
depends on the type of consumers affected. The FCA has also published
various case studies that deal with possible regulatory failures. What is clear
from these case studies is that technical drivers of risk identification have to
a degree given way to political ones: aggregate loss is not itself the sole
driver of failure definition; what matters also to the FCA is the distribution
of that loss. Thus, instances in which large numbers of individuals lose £100
each count less in the regulator's prioritization than those in which fewer
individuals lose £3,000 each, even where the total loss is the same.115 The
notable challenge in the coming years will be whether these publicly-stated
risk tolerances by the regulator will be accepted by politicians or the public
when some of these risks crystallize.
A third set of justificatory difficulties flows from the more particular
functional challenges discussed above. Competitions between drivers present
significant challenges to the setting of objectives, the framings of data, and
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the selection of strategies as well as to enforcement, performance assess-
ment, and the modification of regulatory approaches. All of these challenges
are likely to be echoed by procedural difficulties. Thus, if statements of
objectives, strategic initiatives or performance assessments are afflicted by
divergences of view on the risks that should be the focus of attention, this
will detract from the ability of the regulator to explain and justify its aims, its
strategic directions, and its level of performance. The project of regulatory
justification is rendered a degree more difficult across the board by
unresolved contests between risk identification drivers.
CONCLUSIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR RISK-BASED AND
PROBLEM-CENTERED REGULATION
The literature on risk identification reveals that a host of theoretical, opera-
tional, and political drivers often interact in the construction of risks.
Understanding the interactions between these different drivers provides a
way for regulators and theorists to conceive of the challenges of risk-based
and problem-centred regulation and, in doing so, it provides a basis for
devising responses to these challenges.
The above discussion also constitutes an argument for paying greater
attention to the ways in which risks and problems are selected for attention.
Risk and problem identifications, it has been suggested here, can be seen as
the building blocks of regulation. Approaches to risk/problem identification
are not only multiple but they are liable, as noted, to vary according to the
regulatory tasks that are being undertaken as well as the sectors within which
risks/problems are encountered. The processes of risk selection and identifi-
cation tend, however, to be far less visible, and far more deeply embedded in
organizations than those of evaluating the risks/problems that have been
selected for attention.
Competitions between different drivers of risk and problem construction,
it has been argued, produce a series of functional and procedural challenges
and, while these can be addressed, there is no simple way to reconcile
distinct differences of viewpoint, especially when those differences tend to
be implicit and buried deep within the processes of selecting risks or
problems for attention. Difficulties arise also when drivers are self- or
mutually reinforcing. When this is so, all participants within a debate about
the selection of risks/problems will tend to have stances that are inherently
entrenched ± particular actors select risks/problems in a way that reflects
factors such as their fundamental values and information systems. For such
reasons, they will be slow to respond to the regulators' entreaties to see the
world, and risks/problems, in new or alternative ways.
The prevalence of interacting drivers of risk and problem identification
makes life difficult for risk-based and problem-centred regulators but, as
seen at SEPA, there are potential responses to the challenges faced. In
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seeking to establish clear objectives internally, regulators can use leadership
and participatory processes to foster commonly accepted visions of
priorities, though they face the potential challenges noted above. Another
way to rise to challenges is to operate processes that are targeted at certain
risks ± as identified with reference to drivers that are disclosed. Thus, a
regulator that desires to control a number of politically salient risks/problems
can do so by openly acknowledging that it is concerned to identify and
regulate certain risks/problems with reference to certain themes or public
concerns, rather than confine itself to technical assessments of risks.
Clarity in decision and policy making requires that different ways of
clustering activities into risks/problems are openly acknowledged within
regulatory organizations. Bringing the whole organization into the risk/
problem `conversation' within organizations can help to bring the issue of
the risk/problem construction frameworks of the field and head office, or
other parts of the organization, into the open and help to render them
consistent. One way to encourage this process is for policy makers to operate
feedback loops from the field so that such matters as local sensitivities and
the dictates of effective compliance seeking will be fed into policy making.
This will allow the policy makers to make it clear, inside and beyond the
organization, that risks/problems are being identified with reference to
certain factors for some purposes and with reference to other matters for
other purposes. This is the approach that SEPA adopted and its experience
suggests that such deliberative processes, or risk conversations, can help to
produce more coherent risk/problem identifications across the organization,
or indeed between different regulators who have to regulate the same site for
different risks/problems (for example, environmental and health and safety).
Where an organization as a whole is dominated by a particular set of ideas
and an accepted discourse about risks/problems, there is a risk of myopia or
system-blindness. This results when feedback loops reinforce the currently
dominant frame and stand in the way of the adjustments that are needed to
make that framework relevant to a shifting world. Two further dangers
should be heeded. The first is the cherry picking of politically salient issues
to the detriment of attention to other risks/problems of a less visible but
potentially more serious nature. The second is succumbing to the belief that
all or the majority of risks/problems can be responded to with a project/
problem-centred approach. As projects multiply in number, coordination
costs will tend to rise and this will produce a point of diminishing return
from the method.
Gaining a common understanding of what constitutes a `risk' or a
`problem' within an organization is hard enough, but communicating with
political overseers and the public within and beyond the agency is even more
challenging. One way to deal with external communities is for the regulators
to take on board alternative visions of risks and problems when they are
discharging the various tasks of regulation. An awareness of a variety of
views may be generally salutary, but there is rarely a single view of risk, and
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factors such as risk amplification effects mean that public perceptions of risk
can frequently shift. A regulator may, therefore, find itself reacting to
constantly shifting public or political perceptions and pressures rather than
managing risks strategically in line with its own objectives, mandates or
working constraints.116 A more hopeful way forward may be for regulators
to focus on communicating the rationales for their identification, selection,
and prioritization of risks to external communities, facing head-on the public
scrutiny that transparency brings, and being open about the complex
balancing of risks, resources, and reputations that risk-based regulation
involves.
To end on a positive note, the above analysis does provide a number of
constructive messages for both risk-based and problem-centred approaches.
In stressing the centrality of risk/problem selection, it pushes theory in a
more productive direction, it identifies a set of challenges that regulators
need to address if they are to control more effectively and communicate
more convincingly on risks and problems, and it provides a conceptual
framework for coming to grips with risk and problem identification,
selection, and prioritization. As such, it adds to our understanding of the
dynamics of risk-based and problem-centred approaches and it provides a
basis for dealing with the competing forces embedded within those
approaches.
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